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Abstract: Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in contemporary Russia operate within both 
specific institutional conditions and the frequently contradictory circumstances imposed by a 
hybrid political regime. Legislation and funding policy at the federal and regional levels veers 
between restricting and enabling their ability to act and raises questions about the extent to 
which NGOs can operate independently and participate in the development of a more robust civil 
society in Russia. In the particular sphere of child protection, which remains very much within 
the domain of the state, NGOs must cooperate closely with the authorities in order to implement 
their projects and, whether formally or informally, often become implementers of state social 
policy as a result. This article explores how NGOs involved in the protection of children living 
in state institutions interact with state actors in their policy networks and the extent to which 
such networks may offer these NGOs some scope to act as “policy entrepreneurs” with some 
degree of influence over the direction of policy development and practice in their area of 
expertise. It presents the results of empirical research on the activities of NGOs working with 
vulnerable children in St. Petersburg and Samara, which reveals the interactions between these 
organizations and the authorities to be a complex, multi-layered process which, nevertheless, 
allows them some space for autonomy and the development of policy options.  
 
In recent years, NGOs in Russia have been forced to function within the conditions of what has 
been called a “hybrid” or “electoral authoritarian” regime, which contains elements of both 
democracy and authoritarianism, yet behaves quite differently from more straightforwardly 
democratic or authoritarian political systems.1 Where civil society is concerned, this hybridity is 
also apparent in terms of how the Russian authorities treat domestic NGOs.2 On the one hand, 
since 2010 the state has stepped up its efforts to promote collaboration between the federal and 
regional authorities and certain categories of NGO, namely those deemed to be working in areas 
such as the provision of social and cultural services which align with the interests of the state.3 
This collaboration has involved creating a registry of “socially-oriented” organizations, 
distributing direct federal and regional grants amongst this category of NGO, and improving the 
legal framework for them to participate in tenders for government and municipal service 
                                                        
1 Matthijs Bogaards. 2009. “How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism.” 
Democratization, 2 (16): 399-423; Henry E. Hale. 2010. “Eurasian polities as hybrid regimes: The case of Putin’s 
Russia.” Journal of Eurasian Studies, 1: 33-41. 
2 Francoise Daucé. 2014. “The Government and Human Rights Groups in Russia: Civilized Oppression?” Journal of 
Civil Society, 3 (10): 239-254. 
3 Irina Krasnopolskaya, Yuliia Skokova and Ulla Pape. 2015. “Government-Nonprofit Relations in Russia’s 
Regions: An Exploratory Analysis.” Voluntas, 6 (6): 2238-2266. 
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contracts.4 On the other hand, a set of newly adopted laws, the best-known of which is the 
“Foreign Agents” law of 2012, has introduced restrictions on those NGOs which receive funding 
from abroad, forcing them to undergo onerous official checks and to register themselves as 
“foreign agents” or risk large fines and the suspension of their activity.5 Given that the law thus 
far has been used primarily (although not exclusively) against NGOs working on human rights 
and environmental issues, it has been seen as a campaign of “administrative oppression” against 
those civil society groups deemed to be pursuing interests which run counter to those of the 
state.6  
A further issue which is seen as complicating the position of NGOs in Russia is the 
impact of the legacy of Russia’s Soviet and immediate post-Soviet experience on domestic civil 
society development. Civil society was essentially nonexistent in the Soviet Union because the 
state controlled many aspects of social life, and the need for civic groups to address citizens’ 
concerns and interests was not recognized.7 The majority of NGOs which then appeared during 
and after perestroika in the late 1980s and early 1990s were either Soviet-era organizations, such 
as veterans’ groups, or those that supported people with disabilities, which repackaged 
themselves as civic organizations, but retained close ties with the state8 or were established and 
supported by foreign donors. As a result, in Russia and other countries emerging from state 
socialist regimes, a small and isolated community of professional advocacy NGOs dependent 
largely on Western donors developed alongside a larger number of non-governmental groups 
which had to rely on the authorities for technical and financial support.9 As Dill argues, in the 
context of post-socialism “fiscal and political realities have anchored the role of the state as a 
major source of funding and legitimacy for nongovernmental organizations, precluding an 
independent nonprofit sector.”10 
In this article we explore the ways in which NGOs working in the social sector in Russia 
manage their relationships with the authorities and consider how their activities are structured, 
their role within the policy process, and the extent to which they have opportunities to influence 
the implementation and direction of social policy in the regions where they operate. Using 
empirical data from interviews conducted with NGOs in the major Russian cities of Samara and 
St. Petersburg, we argue that interaction with state agencies is unavoidable for NGOs working in 
the sphere of child protection, yet may also offer them some opportunities to act as policy 
entrepreneurs within their specific policy network. These opportunities are, however, contingent 
upon their success in building credibility for themselves and developing a consensual, rather than 
oppositional, stance in relation to the local authorities.  
                                                        
4 Vladimir Benevolenski. 2014. “Tools of Government for Support of SONPOs in Russia: In Search of Cross-Sector 
Cooperation in the Delivery of Social Services.” National Research University Higher School of Economics Basic 
Research Program Working Papers, 17: 1-22. 
5 RIA Novosti. 2014. “Federalniy zakon 121 ob innostrannykh agentakh,” 16 June. 
http://ria.ru/spravka/20140616/1011656413.html (accessed on 10 November 2015). 
6 Daucé. 2014: 239-254. 
7 C.J. Albertie. 2004. “A Survey & Critique of Russian Law & Its Effects on NGOs.” International Journal of Civil 
Society Law, 2: 12, 14. 
8 Anna Tarasenko and Meri Kulmala. 2015. “Veteranskie organizatsii kak zainteresovannye gruppy: vozmozhnosti i 
ogranicheniia klientelizma dlia zashchity sotsial’nykh prav v regionakh Rossii.” Center for the Study of 
Modernisation Preprint M-42/15, European University St Petersburg. 
http://eu.spb.ru/images/M_center/Tarasenko_Kulmala_working_paper_2015.pdf (accessed on 13 April 2016). 
9 Sarah Henderson. 2003. Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots 
Organizations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom. 2005. “Foreign Assistance, International 
Norms, and NGO development: Lessons from the Russian Campaign.” International Organization, 59: 419-449; 
Julie Hemment. 2012. “Nashi, Youth Voluntarism and Potemkin NGOs: Making sense of civil society in post-
Soviet Russia.” Slavic Review, 2(71): 234-260. 
10 Anne Dill. 2014. “Health Care and Disability NGOs in Croatia: State Relations, Privatization, and 
Professionalism in an Emerging Field.” Voluntas, 25: 1195. 
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Policy Entrepreneurship 
The idea of close cooperation between NGOs operating in the field of social policy and state 
institutions, and of such NGOs functioning as direct providers of social services, is nothing new. 
As Bode11  points out, this type of partnership between state and non-state actors in welfare 
governance has long been the norm in Continental Europe, while Salamon12 and Rhodes13 have 
traced the emergence of this “new” form of public governance in Anglo-Saxon countries since 
the early 1990s. More recently, scholars have begun to trace how this form of governance has 
begun to emerge in more authoritarian regimes such as those in Russia and China.14 As Rhodes15 
points out, within this model of “network” governance, the boundaries between the public, 
private and voluntary sectors become increasingly blurred and policy networks involving both 
formal and informal relationships between state and non-state actors develop around particular 
issues or areas of public policymaking. Policies are developed through bargaining among the 
different members of the network and non-state actors, such as NGOs, join the network because 
they need “the money and legislative authority that only government can provide.”16 Within the 
policymaking process surrounding a particular area of state social policy, Kingdon17 argues that 
a “garbage can” model applies in which there are three components to the process of setting the 
agenda for action in that particular policy area: problems, policies and politics. While these 
streams generally function independently, policy issues will only get on the agenda when they 
are “coupled” and “a problem is recognized, a solution is available, and the political climate 
makes the time right for change.”18  
In this context “policy entrepreneurs” emerge: persistent, well-connected members of a 
particular policy community who are perceived to have expertise relevant to that policy area but 
could be elected or appointed officials, or interested parties, such as NGOs or research 
organizations operating outside the formal government system.19 They have a crucial role to play 
in ensuring that the streams are linked by framing and defining a policy problem in a particular 
way and presenting a credible solution to it in order to persuade policymakers to place an issue 
on the agenda.20 Policy networks of actors who share an interest in a particular policy area thus 
serve as a vital forum for such entrepreneurs to present their definition of a problem and their 
corresponding solution to government actors, build coalitions with these actors and shape the 
terms of the policy debate and the appropriate policy responses that are identified.21 Muccioni,22 
however, cautions against applying Kingdon’s garbage can model, which was developed in the 
specific context of the U.S. policymaking process, wholesale to other polities and emphasizes the 
                                                        
11 Ingo Bode. 2011. “Creeping Marketization and Post-corporatist Governance.” in Susan Philips and Steven Smith, 
eds., Governance and Regulation in the Third Sector. New York, NY: Routledge. 
12 Lester M. Salamon. 1995. Partners in Public Service: Government non-profit relations in the modern welfare 
state. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
13 Rod Rhodes. 1996. “The New Governance: Governing Without Government.” Political Studies, 46: 652-667. 
14 Krasnopolskaya at al. 2015: 2238-2266; Ingo Bode. 2014. “Towards a Neoliberal Third Sector? International 
Lessons from Recent Developments in China” in Matthias Freise and Thorsten Hallmann,  eds., Modernizing 
Democracy: Associations and Associating in the 21st Century. New York: Springer. 
15 Rod Rhodes. 2007. “Understanding Governance: Ten Years On.” Organization Studies, (28:8): 1243-1264. 
16 Ibid.: 1244. 
17 John W. Kingdon.1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Canada: Little, Brown and Company. 
18 Ibid.: 93. 
19 Ibid.: 129. 
20 Nancy C. Roberts and Paula J. King. 1991. “Policy Entrepreneurs: Their Activity Structures and Function in the 
Policy Process.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 1(2): 159. 
21 Michael Mintrom. 1997. “Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation.” American Journal of Political 
Science, 3(41): 738-770. 
22 Gary Mucciaroni. 1992. “The Garbage Can Model and the Study of Policy Making: A Critique.” Polity, 24(3): 
459-482. 
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need to take into account political, economic and social structures which also influence which 
issues get on the agenda. In countries where institutions are more centralized, bureaucrats and 
other institutional actors which tend to be stable and are not subject to removal from office as 
elected officials are, have an important role to play in terms of whether or not issues reach the 
agenda in the first place. As a result, solutions advocated by policy entrepreneurs which do make 
it onto the agenda need to have a “‘good fit’ with the perceived needs and goals of policy 
makers.”23 This is particularly important in the context of the policy area of child protection in 
Russia, where executive agencies, such as ministries at the federal and regional level, and 
committees and inspectorates underpinned by an extensive bureaucracy, dominate the field and 
administer the system.24 As we argue below, the way in which this policy network is constituted 
in the Russian context creates some constraints for NGOs attempting to act as policy 
entrepreneurs, but also creates some opportunities for them to take up this role and promote the 
policy options they deem most appropriate.  
While much of the existing literature on policy networks focuses on the policy process in 
systems conforming to a model of advanced liberal democracy, public policy making and 
windows of opportunity for potential policy entrepreneurs in hybrid/semi-authoritarian regimes 
of the type that Russia is generally seen as conforming to remains an under-explored area. 
Nevertheless, some scholars have explored the role of NGOs as policy entrepreneurs in the 
Chinese political system. Mertha,25 for example, argues that those who were previously excluded 
from the policy making process in China, such as NGOs, activists and journalists, now play an 
active role in this process and its outcomes as they have learned to abide by the “rules of the 
game” and to operate within a system of “fragmented authoritarianism.” Within such a system 
policy change tends to take place incrementally and through bureaucratic bargaining,26 while He 
and Thøgersen27  argue that the Chinese government has been willing to open up some 
consultative space for NGOs and other civic groups in order to bolster the legitimacy of the state 
without in any way jeopardizing the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly on political decision 
making. While the Chinese political system is more overtly authoritarian than the Russian 
system, the two cases nevertheless have some parallels. Under the centralized, semi-authoritarian 
system which has developed during President Putin’s tenure, the state operates largely 
autonomously from society at large and elites are insulated from the public.28 At the same time, 
within Russia’s federalized system, governors have an important role to play in both ensuring 
social and economic stability in their regions and delivering votes to the political regime at the 
center.29 Regional budgets are largely responsible for financing Russia’s extensive system of 
social services and benefits, including children’s homes, and social policy is perceived to be an 
important tool in ensuring regime stability.30 As a result, Krasnopolskaya and co-authors31 argue 
that “regional administrations have decided to invest in grant programs to support non-profit 
organizations in order to strengthen their political legitimacy both in the opinion of the local 
                                                        
23 Mucciaroni. 1992: 474. 
24 Sirotstvo v Rossii: problem i puti ikh razresheniia. Issledovanie. 2011. Moscow: 49.  www.philanthropy.ru 
(accessed on 13 April 2016). 
25 Andrew Mertha. 2009. “‘Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0’: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process.” 
The China Quarterly, 200: 996. 
26 Ibid.: 995-1012. 
27 Baogang He and Stig Thøgersen. 2010. “Giving the People a Voice? Experiments with consultative authoritarian 
institutions in China.” Journal of Contemporary China, 19(66): 675. 
28 Samuel A. Greene. 2014. Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s Russia. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
29 Gulnaz Sharafutdinova. 2010. “Subnational Governance in Russia: How Putin Changed the Contract with His 
Agents and the Problems It Created for Medvedev.” Publius, 4(40): 672-696. 
30 Thomas Remington, Irina Soboleva, Anton Sobolev and Mark Urnov. 2013. “Economic and Social Policy Trade-
Offs in the Russian Regions: Evidence from Four Case Studies.” Europe-Asia Studies, 65(10): 1855-1876. 
31 Krasnopolskaya at al. 2015: 2238-2266. 
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population and of the federal authorities.” In this way, socially-oriented NGOs now have 
opportunities to engage as participants in policy networks at the regional level which were 
previously much more limited.  
 
Socially-oriented NGOs and Child Protection: The Policy Background  
While a federal-level funding scheme of presidential grants for civil society groups, including 
those working on social projects, was established in 2006, official attempts to involve NGOs 
more formally in the provision of social services in Russia were stepped up in 2010 with the 
passing of legislation aimed specifically at enhancing funding for socially-oriented NGOs and 
cooperation between the government and this type of organization.32 In 2011 a state list (reestr) 
of socially oriented non-commercial organizations was established. The state currently offers 
three types of grants and subsidies for NGOs: 
• subsidies supporting socially oriented NGOs at the expense of the federal budget; 
• subsidies to cover utility payments made by NGOs and the rental of office space; 
• targeted funding of NGOs by regional and municipal authorities.33 
In 2011, in St. Petersburg, the list included 170 organizations; in 2012, the number grew to 215. 
A total of 364 projects were supported in 2011, and 384 in 2012.34  
Since 2011 the federal government and regional authorities have been conducting grant 
competitions for “socially oriented” NGOs to take on the provision of certain social services 
traditionally provided by the state. NGOs specializing in child protection have frequently been 
successful in winning funding through such programs, and, alongside other socially-oriented 
organizations, can receive funding on either a competitive or uncontested basis from regional-
level committees, such as the local Committee on Social Policy or the Committee on Youth 
Policy.35 In addition, under new legislation passed in 2012, all levels of government must use 
small and medium enterprises and socially-oriented NGOs to provide 15 percent of the total 
annual value of their contracts for social service provision.36 A further set of laws has been 
adopted more recently to increase (at least formally) the significance of NGOs as actors within 
the social policy system, and to improve the dialogue between state and non-state actors. The 
Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 212 “On the foundations of public monitoring in the 
Russian Federation” (Ob osnovakh obshchestvennogo kontrolia v Rossiiskoi Federatsii) was 
signed on 21 July 2014. Some significant amendments were incorporated the same day (21 July 
2014) into the Federal Law “On Public Associations” (Ob obshchestvennyh ob’edineniiakh). 
These laws prescribe the establishment of public oversight councils within different executive 
bodies, and the obligatory inclusion of NGOs as members of these councils. 
The increasing involvement of socially-oriented NGOs in the provision of social services 
has had two major consequences. Firstly, the state has strengthened its control over non-state 
organizations acting in this sphere. Secondly, the state has made channels for cross-sectoral 
collaboration more open. These measures have undoubtedly had some influence on the 
independence of NGOs, but some researchers consider the effects of these recent legal initiatives 
to have certain positive implications for such organizations, particularly at the local level. For 
instance, in the case of St. Petersburg, Anna Tarasenko argues that the role of civic associations 
                                                        
32 Ibid.: 2238-2266. 
33 Anna Tarasenko. 2013. “Analiz praktik podderzhki SO NKO po dannym reestra poluchatelei gosudarstvennoi 
podderzhki.” Negosudarstvennye nekommercheskie organizatsii v Sankt-Peterburge. SPb: TsRNO: 15. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Krasnopolskaya at al. 2015: 2238-2266. 
36 Benevolenski. 2014: 1-22. 
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in solving social problems has increased, although organizations working with high-priority 
vulnerable groups, such as war veterans, tend to be the most successful at gaining funding from 
the local authorities.37 In addition, previous research conducted by one of the authors between 
2011 and 2015 indicates that many socially-oriented NGOs, while recognizing the necessity of 
applying for and receiving state funding, nevertheless remain keen to defend their ability to 
operate as independently as possible. They also felt that their increasing involvement in public 
oversight councils and other interactions with the authorities had led to some positive 
developments in social policy and emphasized the importance of continuing this and other types 
of collaboration with local officials in particular.38 
The sphere of child protection is an area of social policy which remains very much within 
the remit of the state. The current political discourse constructs the problem of child protection 
as one of the most important challenges for contemporary Russian society. This is hardly 
surprising given the number of children living without parental care: as of 2010, they numbered 
731,000, with 260,000 of these living in long-term institutional care. While the federal 
government provides funding for these institutions, the allocation of this funding and the 
provision of social services in this area is largely the responsibility of regional and municipal 
authorities.39 Interest in the topic increased sharply in mid-2012, partly due to the beginning of 
foster care reform in Russia, the main points of which were announced by the Order of the 
President of the Russian Federation No. 761 “On a National Strategy of Action for Children 
2012 - 2017" (adopted on 1 June 2012).40 Soon after, in September 2012 a “Coordinating 
Council on the Implementation of a National Strategy for Action for Children 2012-2017” was 
established.41 The Council involved both state officials and leaders of the most influential NGOs 
in the sphere of child protection. Partly, interest in the problem of protecting children was 
prompted by an international scandal which took place between Russia and the U.S. in 2012 and 
which also attracted another wave of official interest in the problem of child protection. Law 
No. 272 “On measures against persons involved in violations of fundamental human rights and 
freedoms, rights and freedoms of citizens of Russian Federation”, also known as the “Dima 
Yakovlev Law” was signed on 28 December 2012. The Law imposed a ban on the adoptions of 
Russian orphans by American citizens (Art. 4) and was passed in retaliation for the U.S. 
adoption of a law sanctioning Russian officials alleged to have been responsible for the death in 
custody of the lawyer Sergey Magnitskii. It was named after a Russian child who had been 
adopted by U.S. parents and died in 2008 due to negligence.42 In January 2013 the United Russia 
party, which holds the majority of seats in Russia’s parliament, initiated the project “Russia 
needs all its children” (Rossii vazhen kazhdiy rebenok) which was aimed at improving domestic 
adoption rates and living conditions for children in the care of the state.43  
The problem of protecting children living without parental care is thus recognized as one 
which is both legitimate and extremely important at the state level. The national strategy defines 
the main aims of the state’s policy towards the protection of children in care, which has become 
the conceptual basis for proposed reforms of the institutional and foster care systems: 
                                                        
37 Tarasenko. 2013: 16. 
38 Eleanor Bindman. 2015. “The state, civil society and social rights in contemporary Russia.” East European 
Politics, 3(31): 342-360. 
39 Sirotstvo v Rossii. 2011. 
40 No. 761 “On National Strategy of Action for Children 2012 – 2017."  
http://base.garant.ru/70183566/#friends#ixzz3oloLfpdg  (accessed on 3 May 2016). 
41 See the Provision on the Coordinating Council. http://state.kremlin.ru/council/36/statute (accessed on 13 April 
2016). 
42 The Moscow News. 2012. “Russian parliament passes anti-US adoption law,” 26 December. 
http://themoscownews.com/russia/20121226/191064431.html (accessed on 2 December 2015). 
43 Edinaya Rossiya. 2012. “Rossii vazhen kazhdii rebionok.” https://er.ru/projects/rossii-vazhen-kazhdyj-rebenok/ 
(accessed on 2 December 2015). 
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• priority placed on family-based care for children currently living in state institutions; 
• reform of institutions for orphaned children, including children with physical and 
learning disabilities;  
• establishment of a system of post-institution support (post-internat). 
The problem of child protection for those in care have also become part of the more general 
official discourse on demographic policy, the protection of motherhood, and traditional family 
values. In 2014, the "Concept on State Family Policy in the Russian Federation for the period 
until 2025" was adopted.44 The concept indicates that a traditionalist view of “family values” has 
become a steady trend in the transformation of gender relations in modern Russia. Zhanna 
Chernova argues that in current public and political discourse “the traditional family model and 
patriarchal gender relations have become idealized.”45 A Concept adopted in 2007 declared the 
main principles and aims of the state’s policy towards young families. In particular “the principle 
of continuity of the generations orientes the state and young families towards the preservation 
and maintenance of the relationship between the generations, respect and reproduction of 
traditions of family education in young families, and the transmission and continuity of Russian 
socio-cultural values.”46 It also interprets the aim of state policy toward young families as 
“strengthening the institution of the Russian family on the basis of people’s traditional socio-
cultural values, spirituality and local way of life.”47 
Since the very beginning of the 1990s, NGOs have played a significant role in the sphere 
of child protection in Russia. The structure of Russia’s institutional care system for children 
offers rather broad opportunities for such organizations to assist in this area. Every stage of the 
process of placing a child in this system has a place for NGO activity such as: working with 
mothers who have abandoned their children, with “problem” (neblagopoluchnaia) families, and 
with adopting families. NGOs also support children in shelters and children’s homes, and after 
they leave the care system.48 Leaders of NGOs, such as the Foundation to Support Children in 
Difficult Life Circumstances 49 (also known as the Marina Gordeeva Foundation) and the 
National Foundation for the Prevention of Cruelty Against Children 50 (previously: Assistance to 
Russian Orphans (ARO)), are involved in federal public councils, which advise the president and 
monitor the implementation of the National Strategy on Action for Children.51 Approximately 30 
private and corporate charity foundations provide financial support for children in the care 
system: these include Viktoriia, Rasprav’ kryl’ia, and others. Some foundations do not have their 
own equity, but fundraise instead: Otkazniki, Detskie domiki, and various others.52 Some of the 
federal-level NGOs have a substantial volume of opportunities to deliver services, and may be 
regarded as implementers of state social policy. Some of them are included in the federal Public 
Chamber (Obshchestvennaia Palata), or other public councils at the federal level. There are 
more than 1,000 NGOs and charity foundations which deal solely with problems in the care 
system functioning at the regional level.53  
                                                        
44 Zhanna Chernova. 2010. “Molodaia semia kak ob'ekt/sub'ekt semeinoi politiki.’ Polit.ru, 30 November. 
http://polit.ru/article/2010/11/30/family/ (accessed on 12 March 2015). 
45 Ibid. 
46 No. AF-163/06 “On Conception of the State Policy Towards Young Family,” 8 May 2007. 
http://ivo.garant.ru/#/basesearch/концепция государственной политики в отношении молодой семьи:0 
(accessed on 20 December 2015). 
47 Ibid. 
48 Sirotstvo v Rossii. 2011. 
49 http://www.fond-detyam.ru/. 
50 www.nfpcc.ru. 
51 For example, the Coordinating Council on Implementation of the “National Strategy for Action for Children 
2012-2017”. 
52 Sirotstvo v Rossii. 2011. 
53 Ibid. 
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Description of the Field Research  
The empirical research this article is based on was conducted as part of an international research 
project on “Network governance: A tool for understanding Russian policy-making?” During the 
field research, 50 interviews were conducted with experts (researchers, politicians, and 
journalists), officials at different levels, and the heads of NGOs in St.Petersburg, Samara and 
Moscow. In this article we use data from interviews with 9 NGOs (3 in Samara, 4 in 
St.Petersburg, and 2 in Moscow with NGOs functioning at the federal level), and also some 
expert interviews in which the particular problems of cooperation between NGOs and 
governmental bodies were discussed.  
NGOs working in the sphere of child protection in Russia are numerous and diverse. 
During the field research, we sought to collect materials about different NGOs, from local 
volunteer organizations to groups functioning at the federal level, in order to tease out tendencies 
in their relations with the state and operational conditions which might be the same or similar for 
different NGOs. In preparing a list of informants, we tried to select the most active and well-
known NGOs in the two regions. To identify informants, we used the results of participant 
observation of regional cross-sectoral meetings, and preliminary expert interviews with regional 
researchers, journalists, and politicians. In terms of the type of NGO profiled in this study, a 
number of scholars have reviewed the type, structure, and scope of Russia’s NGOs, and, despite 
using different labels, their characterizations are similar, with each researcher identifying three 
specific types of organization.55 The researchers highlight grassroots organizations which focus 
their campaigning activity almost exclusively on local or single issues; professional policy or 
advocacy organizations whose members are often drawn further into the international NGO 
circuit through conferences and training overseas; and government affiliates or GONGOs, which 
are closely linked to the operations of the state.56 The following NGOs took part in this research 
project:  
Samara:  
Charity foundation Radost’ [Happiness]. The organization declares its mandate to be 
primarily charitable, although members of this NGO are involved in many different types of 
activities, including local politics. The leader of this NGO is a member of the regional Public 
Chamber, and also heads a special section of the Samara regional legislature, which is open 
for discussions among state and non-state actors. In some senses, the organization acts as a 
professional NGO.  
Domiki Detstva [Childhood Homes]  is a relatively new NGO which first appeared as a 
volunteer organization several years ago. The organization focuses on developing its own 
projects, and its leader is included in many formal and informal collaborative networks 
between state and non-state actors. According to Cook and Vinogradova’s typology, this 
NGO falls under the definition of a grassroots organization.  
St. Petersburg: 
Non-state children’s home Derevni SOS [Village SOS]. This is one of several children’s 
villages which operate in different regions of Russia and other countries around the world. 
The NGO has a foreign founder and has operated in St. Petersburg since 2000. The NGO is 
not a grassroots Russian organization, nor does it act as a professional NGO. The cross-
                                                        
55 Jo Crotty. 2009. “Making A Difference? NGOs and Civil Society Development in Russia.” Europa-Asia Studies, 
1(61): 90. 
56 Linda Cook and Elena Vinogradova. 2006. “NGOs and Social Policy-Making in Russia's Regions.” Problems of 
Post-Communism, 5(53): 28-41; Laura Henry. 2006. “Shaping Social Activism in Post-Soviet Russia: Leadership, 
Organizational Diversity and Innovation.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 2(22): 99-124. 
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regional charity Russian Committee on SOS Children’s Villages, which is the umbrella 
organization leading all 6 SOS Children’s Villages in Russia, does, however, function as a 
professional NGO. 
Vrachi detiam [Doctors for Children] – A highly skilled professional NGO, acting in St. 
Petersburg since 2001, when it was established by volunteers of the international 
humanitarian organization “The Right to Health.” At present the organization provides 
professional social services and develops different projects on child protection, including 
protection of orphans and children at risk. The staff of this organization consists of 
professional social workers, psychologists, doctors, and speech therapists.  
Partniorstvo kazhdomu rebionku [Partnership for Every Kid] – A professional NGO with 
extensive experience in developing social projects and advocacy activities, and the provision 
of professional social services. At the end of the 1990s the organization was established in 
St. Petersburg as the Russian branch of the UK organization Every Child, and worked under 
this name until 2009. The staff consists of professional social workers, psychologists, 
doctors, and speech therapists. 
Roditel’skii most [Parents’ Bridge] appeared as a civic organization in the mid-1980s. It is 
focused on charitable activities and is well-known in both St. Petersburg and Russia more 
widely for working with foster families, and actively improving adoption rates.  
 In addition to the interviews, we conducted participant-observation of various types of 
cross-sectoral communication. These included meetings of councils, teams, and working groups. 
In selecting events to observe, we were guided by our goal of observing communication and 
practices of collaboration between state and non-state actors. We tried to select the best-known 
fora and during the meetings we paid attention to spatial segregation, the distribution of roles and 
credentials, the general tone of the conversation, topics suggested for discussion, and the 
dynamics of the discussion. In coming to the meetings we had a chance not only to observe, but 
also to communicate with other participants. Some of the talks were recorded and transcripts 
analyzed. The talks gave us information not only about how this communication took place, but 
also provided stories about successful or failed collaborations, and about the dynamics of 
relations between state and non-state actors. We observed the following fora for cross-sectoral 
communication:  
1. Public Chamber in Samara; 
2. Council on problems of fatherhood, motherhood and childhood at Samara City Duma;  
3. Expert Council of the Children’s Ombudsman, St. Petersburg;  
4. Open city supervision, organized by the NGO Partniorstvo kazhdomu rebionku in St. 
Petersburg.57 
                                                        
57 The Public Chamber in Samara is a state institution relevant for all three policy areas covered in this article. The 
chamber formally has independent status, but the selection process of candidates and the way the chamber operates 
links it closely to the authorities. Its proclaimed purpose is to ensure public oversight over the executive and 
legislative branches, and public participation in governance. The chamber is subdivided into a number of 
commissions which at times also raise public discussion on issues concerning the three policy areas. This heightens 
attention to said issues among media and decision-makers, and the chamber sometimes gives policy 
recommendations. The main emphasis of the public chamber is on giving advice to the authorities, particularly by 
calling the attention of the authorities to specific problems, and monitoring. It has quite weak potential for 
coordination of different sectors and institutions. Members are generally considered loyal to the state and ready to 
compromise, and the chamber has rather close links to the regional governor. Implementation of social policy is not 
part of the functions of the chamber, and it has no decision-making power. 
The Samara city parliament’s Council on problems of fatherhood, motherhood and childhood was established in 
2013 as a response to the need for an arena to discuss problems related to child welfare. Council members include 
officials, heads of children’s homes, the Children’s Ombudsman, and NGO representatives. The council is headed 
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Discussion: “It always has to come from above, there is no sense in starting from the 
bottom"58 
Our interviews with the leaders of various NGOs in Samara and St. Petersburg indicate that the 
main and, indeed, only possible way for sustainable development of NGOs in the sphere of child 
protection is close cooperation with the authorities. In this section, we will consider precisely 
how NGOs approach cooperation with the authorities; which formats of cross-sectoral 
communication are available to NGOs and representatives of the authorities; the efforts which 
should be made by NGOs to operate in the field and to improve their own independent projects; 
and the results which may be achieved by NGOs in the conditions of contemporary Russia.   
 
Cross-sectoral collaboration: a façade of democratic governance, or new chances for policy 
entrepreneurship? 
The contemporary legal field creates specific spaces for communication between the authorities 
and NGOs, with the Law “On the origins of public control in Russian Federation” prescribing 
the establishment of “instruments of public oversight,” or expert councils, in all regions, at all 
levels of executive power, and in regional legislative bodies. Execution of the law is uneven in 
different regions and at different levels of authority, although in the Samara region during the 
last two years, these councils have been established in all the main governmental bodies of the 
city and the region, including the city Duma, the Samara regional Duma, and the regional 
ministry for social demography and family policy. In addition, dozens of different public 
councils and special working groups have been established at the lower levels of executive 
power: these are open to NGOs, and some are even managed by the leaders of NGOs. All the 
NGOs which took part in the research stressed the availability and importance of participating in 
these public councils. Belonging to a public council does not in and of itself guarantee 
                                                        
by an NGO leader. Meetings are held 4-5 times a year and typically consist of reports made by specialists on 
specific problems and subsequent discussion, followed by recommendations as to how the issue should be resolved. 
The advice function of the policy system is therefore highlighted. While not decision-makers as such, the council 
produces recommendations that legislators and policy-makers are required to consider, though not obliged to follow. 
Coordination is a key task of the council. It coordinates activities and ideas among officials, specialists, and NGOs. 
The council is not involved in the direct implementation of social policy; neither does it have a formal monitoring 
function. 
The Expert council under St. Petersburg’s Children’s Ombudsman This council is intended to facilitate discussion 
of different problems related to child welfare. Participation is rather flexible. There is a set of core members, but 
external experts are also invited when certain issues are being discussed. Participants include officials, experts, 
politicians, and NGOs. The agenda is set by the Ombudsman apparatus. The council has decision-making authority; 
the decisions are recorded in protocols and it is obligatory for executive organs to implement them. The advisory 
function is important—the council produces recommendations addressed directly to the executive organs. It also 
coordinates the solution of particular problems raised for discussion. The status of these recommendations is quite 
high, and the council can thereby have an important influence on how social policy is implemented, though 
indirectly (through recommendations rather than direct involvement in policy implementation). Its monitoring role 
consists in observing the implementation of its decisions and recommendations, and reporting to the mayor and 
executive organs about the decisions. 
Child welfare supervisions, St. Petersburg is a regular open event organized by the NGO “Partniorstvo” in St. 
Petersburg. The state is involved through the participation of municipal guardianship departments, social workers, 
and other representatives of the municipal services. NGO representatives and international experts also participate in 
the supervisions. Supervisions are a monthly forum for discussing social problems, usually by focusing on 
individual cases with general applicability. The arena produces advice on how to improve the skills of practitioners, 
e.g. in working with orphans, families, and children with specific problems. The advice given does not have to be 
taken into account, but may influence both the norms of social work practice, as well as practitioners’ professional 
standards. Supervisions play a relatively important role in coordination of solutions of the above-mentioned 
problems. The forum monitors and evaluates the usefulness of the recommendations that they produce in the 
meetings, through repeated participation of the same participants. 
58 From the interview with St. Petersburg’s Vrachi detiam. 
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participation in administrative decision-making, and a public council may not produce any 
decisions at all, but the opportunity to take part provides a channel of communication between 
NGOs and the authorities, and is valued on its own merit. 
Meanwhile, according to the interviews, the legal field establishes the order in which cross-
sectoral collaboration takes place and the distribution of roles among the participants. According 
to one of our respondents:  
We can say and write anything—for example that we are establishing independent public 
structures. But still you need to realize that objectively the forums are functioning in the 
government. This means they are all consensus structures and they were established with 
the purpose of finding consensus. People practicing constructive approaches to 
interaction with the authorities must take part there. Not those who are oriented toward 
confrontation or contradiction, but those who have another vision of the problem, other 
ideas about how to deal with them, but with the desire to reach an agreement (Public 
Chamber in Samara).  
Participation in meetings of the public councils or other such platforms facilitates 
communication between members of NGOs, policymakers, and politicians. Decision-making in 
these fora appears, based on the interviews, to be a complex, non-linear process, with regular 
discussions helping to gather ideas and issues in need of resolution. Reaching a decision requires 
many different components, including in-depth research of the problem, an initiative group 
formed of specialists, which meets within the framework of the local public chamber or a public 
oversight council within the regional legislature, and the opportunity to engage with local 
politicians. One interviewee, who was both the head of an NGO promoting foster care and a 
member of the Samara regional Duma’s Working Group on Parenthood and Childhood, 
described the discussion process which usually took place at meetings of her group: 
Various officials take part in our work, including representatives of the [regional] 
Ministry for Demographic Development; they are always there. Representatives of the 
State Duma who work on community issues also always come, and people from the 
regional Duma, the regional governor’s office, and, if necessary, from the regional 
Ministry for Health. Then of course there are all those who represent non-
governmental organizations which work with children. We develop recommendations 
for amending the relevant legislation and so on—it’s not simply a box-ticking 
exercise, these are vital questions (Samara City Duma Council). 
Another respondent was also positive about the work of such fora in terms of influencing the 
development of regional social policy: 
The Public Chamber gives us an additional forum through which we can engage. We 
work with whoever is in power, we are very pragmatic. We should be using any 
opportunity we have to express our opinion and the Public Chamber is a high-level 
body, it gives us more access to those in power and, over time, our relationship with 
them has grown closer. It’s a really good new forum for us that we’ve had for six years 
now and they do listen to us (Public Chamber in Samara). 
In terms of specific policy developments, this same respondent talked about a project run by 
their organization which sought to increase the number of free places in kindergartens available 
for children from young families. An initiative group at the Samara Public Chamber put a great 
deal of effort into implementing the project over a number of years, but it only really moved 
forward when a new (and ultimately successful) mayoral candidate was made aware of it: 
We always used to invite the previous mayors to our conferences and so on, they would 
always say “yes, yes, yes” but nothing would happen. Then, when we were in the process 
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of electing Azarov,59 he came to the [Samara Oblast] Public Chamber to tell us about his 
election manifesto. We said our project was a priority, one which should be included in 
his manifesto. It was included… and they started to build more kindergartens, we saw 
them ourselves in Samara (Public Chamber in Samara).  
In communicating and investigating particular problems together, state and non-state actors may 
organize working groups, which strive to solve problems as a single force. During such 
interactions, the boundaries between the state and non-state actors seem to disappear. Such 
foundations as efficiency, dealing with the bureaucratic apparatus, and the common goal of 
making the lives of children better, appear to be much more significant.  
Some cases in our research show how people can move from one sector to another:  
Q.: Why have you moved from the state service to a non-governmental organization? 
A.: I interacted with them [NGOs], even when I worked for the municipality, well ... It 
happened so easily. I feel comfortable in these working conditions, and see a lot of 
opportunities to realize myself creatively. We are not exhausted here. That is, when we are 
preparing the project, in principle, we know the problem, and we ourselves are looking for 
solutions. We are free in it. That is interesting (Samara’s Charity foundation Radost’). 
People like this are extremely valuable for the NGOs since they know the formal and informal 
rules of collaboration with the state agencies, they maintain their informal contacts in the state 
agencies, and became a valuable conductor of cross-sectoral communication.  
Where the St. Petersburg case study is concerned, the number of public councils is considerably 
fewer in comparison with Samara. Nevertheless, communication between NGOs and the local 
authorities is equally important. Leaders of NGOs try to use the platforms available to them for 
communication with state actors. According to interviews conducted in St. Petersburg, the 
regional public chamber, child ombudsman, or even platforms at the federal level can act as 
spaces in which strategic or particularly urgent questions can be addressed to the authorities in 
general, or to specific officials:  
Since 2010 the [St. Petersburg] Committee on Social Policy has given out a subsidy 
which covers your expenses in terms of feeding children and providing them with 
clothes, but there is not any specific law which sets a mandatory amount or which is 
calculated on the basis of the number of children needing care. So every year this 
decision has to be taken in a particular way, in accordance with the current legislation 
and mechanism of law drafting. Every year we are forced to appeal to the [regional] 
Child Ombudsman so that she will remind the officials on the Committee of our 
existence (Non-state children’s home Derevni SOS ).  
In both regions, communication with the authorities is recognized as an integral part of the 
strategic work done by NGOs working on child protection. Indeed, according to our 
interviewees, the success and sustainable development of particular NGO projects depends 
entirely on communication with the authorities. Often the issue of financial support is a key 
aspect of this relationship. In the current situation, the state’s federal and regional grant and 
subsidy programs are the main—and frequently the only—source of project funding available to 
this type of NGO. Nevertheless, success in competing for such funding is by no means 
guaranteed, making fundraising one of the most complicated aspects of NGO activity: 
We have written applications for a variety of grants, including government and presidential 
schemes. However, grant funding has its pros and cons. The downside is that you do not 
know whether you will receive the grant or not, how big it will be, whether you have a 
subsidy or not, when it will be announced, and when the money will arrive. And the most 
                                                        
59 Dmitriy Igorevich Azarov, the United Russia mayoral candidate, was elected mayor of Samara in October 2010 
and served until 2014. 
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important thing is that subsidies cover the organization’s expenses. It means that first the 
organization has to find the means to provide services throughout the year. And only then 
can it request reimbursement of expenses. So we must constantly and actively work to 
raise funds, which of course takes a lot of time and effort (St. Petersburg’s Partniorstvo 
kazhdomu rebionku). 
Leaders and members of NGOs argue that successful work by NGOs protecting children in 
today’s Russia is impossible without close communication with authorities. However, leaders of 
NGOs tend to interpret the current transformations in the legal and social policy fields in two 
ways. From one side, the penetration of the state into the projects and activities of NGOs is 
understood as a violation of their independence. From the other side, NGOs tend to see the 
“domestication” of NGOs as an invitation for collaboration, which, while it may be nominal and 
formal, may also bring real results in solving problems.  
Policy networks surrounding child protection are active on formal and informal levels. Active 
members of NGOs have a wide variety of opportunities for meetings and discussions with state 
actors at different forums. Informal communication between state actors and NGO 
representatives helps solve everyday problems, and helps to form a common vision of particular 
difficulties. Although the formal participation of non-state actors in official platforms, like public 
chambers or councils, creates the chance to develop strategic recommendations, and access to 
policy making, it still entails a lot of barriers—including enormous bureaucracy, the complicated 
structure of ministries and distribution of responsibilities, legal restrictions, and the necessity of 
waiting for the appropriate moment to propose recommendations.  
Among state actors, we include low-level executive branch officials: officers and heads of 
executive departments. They are the state partners who are available for negotiations. The 
boundary between state and non-state actors at this level is permeable. Former officials may turn 
into NGO activists, and vice versa. State and non-state actors may combine their efforts to 
achieve common goals. Any state actor has access to the “vertical of power,” meaning that he 
can get in touch with higher level officials. They can act as providers of programs and give 
suggestions to their superiors. Meanwhile, in one way or another, these low level executive 
officials suffer from the same barriers that the NGOs face.  
 
Improvement of NGO projects 
According to our interviews, any long-term project, which needs sustainable financial support to 
survive, must be funded by the authorities. Some NGOs use a proactive approach, discussing 
potential projects with officials before they have started. Here the NGOs often have to find a 
compromise between their own project and the needs of the state social service system. This 
process involves not only close collaboration with the authorities, but also the expectation that 
the NGO will provide a service which in some way conforms to the aims of state social policy. 
One of our respondents explained how their NGO had managed to persuade the municipal 
authorities to finance their project:  
In 2006 we opened the city's first social hostel for minors, and initially we made contact 
with the administration of the Kalinin district [in St. Petersburg]. We told them “we are 
going to apply to one of our donors with a project. If you are willing to provide the 
premises, we are willing to repair it, educate the staff, and support this project for the first 
two years. After two years, are you prepared to finance this hostel from the municipal 
budget?” And, in fact, that's how it was opened (Vrachi detiam). 
 Achieving this kind of funding is, however, complicated by the fact that child protection in the 
care system is managed by several different ministries and other bodies at the federal and 
regional level. A project may be rejected by one ministry, even if several others strongly support 
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the project, but approval is required from all the relevant ministries whose responsibilities may 
be affected by the project:  
Even if the Committee on Social Policy supports us, there is the Committee on Finance. 
And the Committee on Social Policy has to explain to the Committee on Finance why such 
a big budget item should be approved. This means the Committee on Finance has to really 
want to understand what the project is trying to achieve, and the Committee on Social 
Policy needs to really explain this properly. And if this is not a priority for any of them 
personally, the chances that someone will be willing to justify it and the others to listen is 
very small. So there are a lot of conditions (St. Petersburg’s Partniorstvo kazhdomu 
rebionku). 
If an NGO wants to initiate an independent project, which has not been agreed with the 
authorities in advance, developing the project is a difficult and time-consuming process. 
According to our interview with the head of the NGO Partniorstvo, her organization wanted to 
extend a social program it offered for families with disabled children called “Breathing Space” 
[“Peredyshka”]. The program initially offered a service for parents who are unable to leave their 
children without care, even for a short period of time, and was established to train specialists 
who could stand in for parents of children with severe disabilities for a certain period of time in 
order to give the parents a break. The service is provided by the NGO for free, and they make 
considerable efforts to maintain its availability. Finding regular funding for this program is one 
of the NGO’s main concerns, as it also runs various other projects and the problem of finding 
financial support for “Breathing Space” has to be resolved each year. According to our 
interview, the NGO engaged in advocacy activities and made a big effort to improve the 
program: 
We use all available opportunities to improve this service. In the Gordeeva Foundation 
competition, we had three minutes to prove the necessity of this program. We did it, and 
we won. We needed to publish an article in the foundation’s newsletter, and we did that 
too. We sit in the Public Chamber and observe what is happening there (St. Petersburg’s 
Partniorstvo kazhdomu rebionku).  
The program gained support on many levels: the President, the Legislative Assembly, and the 
Regional Committee on Social Policy confirmed the importance of the program. Breathing 
Space was included in the president’s program from 1 June 2012.60 However, until now the 
program has not been included in the list of mandatory programs financed by the state budget. 
Money for the program comes through different charitable channels, including on-line 
donations.61 Since September 2015, the Committee for press and cooperation with the media in 
the Government of St. Petersburg has supported Breathing Space with public announcements and 
media coverage (See Figure 1).  
 
                                                        
60 No. 761 “On National Strategy of Action for Children 2012 – 2017," 5:4 
http://base.garant.ru/70183566/#friends#ixzz3oloLfpdg (accesses on 3 May 2016). 
61 See the website of the program: http://peredishka.ru/donate. 
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Figure 1. Example of a poster provided by the St. Petersburg government to support the NGO 
Breathing Space. The inscription on the poster reads: Irina and Dmitriy are visiting a café for the 
first time in 5 years, having entrusted the care of their child to a professional family. 
 
Meanwhile, the leaders of NGOs recognize the connection between budgetary funding and 
independence. Some of them regard government funding as a partial benefit, which may entail 
both positive and negative consequences:  
Q: Is full governmental funding desirable for your NGO?  
A: This is a moot point. From the perspective of sustainable development—yes. From the 
viewpoint of control—no. Because we have all the checks by the prosecutor's office, 
sanitary and epidemiological stations, fire inspections, tax inspections already now [the 
NGO is partly funded by the state – E.B.]. … Because we also communicate with 
colleagues from organizations, and we see that they're inundated with paperwork. 
Planning, reporting, etc. Thank God, we can minimize the paperwork that we do. Because 
we do not work with papers, we work with children. Therefore, when it comes to funding 
from the state, there is a risk that the state will climb all over everything and tell us 
“where we must plant pansies, and where roses” (St. Petersburg’s Non-state children’s 
home Derevni SOS). 
Russia’s existing laws create opportunities for direct collaboration between NGOs and state 
bodies. Since 2012, St. Petersburg has regularly held competitions among NGOs for the 
implementation of state programs. In the event of winning one of these competitions, the NGO 
assumes the function of providing services on behalf of the state social system. From one 
perspective, this could mean the total loss of independence for such organizations. However, 
empirical research shows that NGOs may combine the execution of state powers with their own 
projects, and still understand themselves as a part of civil society.  
It is impossible to identify NGOs which are solely managing their own projects or solely 
executing state social programs. One NGO may have a “state” project which provides the NGO 
with a certain stability—not only financial stability, but also legitimizing its activities in general. 
During the period of that project, the NGO may develop its own projects which bring something 
new to the state social welfare system, rather than simply assisting state bodies in running their 
own services. 
Different NGOs practice cooperation with state bodies on different levels: from simple 
communication to the execution of state social services. Nevertheless, none of these strategies 
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means the rejection of independence and membership in civil society. In trying to preserve some 
autonomy, NGOs devise and implement complex strategies to deliver their own projects. Both 
being proactive and involved in advocacy assumes close interaction with the state, although 
these two strategies have conceptual differences. Implementing independent projects supports 
the status of an NGO as a subject of social policy, whereas a proactive approach is more likely to 
turn NGOs into executors of state social programs. This latter strategy is much better suited for 
the political and legal conditions of contemporary Russia.  
 
Positioning of NGOs in dialogue with the authorities: the construction of the “right” reputation, 
being in opposition, and the price of consensus  
In order to develop the type of formal and informal relationships with local officials which can 
support their work and to be viewed by the authorities as a respectable and serious partner, 
NGOs operating in the social sphere must develop their reputation as credible providers of 
expertise and/or service. Indeed, according to our interviews, reputation is a significant 
component of a successfully functioning NGO: 
This is an important part of, simply, the economic survival of the organization. In order to 
enable it to compete with other non-profit organizations, it must prove that it is doing 
something socially significant. Or it should do something politically significant, well, for 
the state (Center_Family_SPb). 
As part of its efforts to maintain a credible reputation, one of the NGOs we interviewed 
organizes regular meetings.62 Usually the authorities do not take part in supervising these events. 
However, the staff of municipal guardianship departments, social workers, and other specialists 
from municipal services or NGOs do participate. Supervision is always managed by members of 
Partniorstvo, with the leader of the evaluation always positioned as an expert. This evaluation 
process helps to construct and support the group’s image as a professional expert NGO, and it 
also improves the popularity and significance of Partniorstvo—another important way of 
maximizing contacts with state bodies. 
Personal contacts with officials and a history of working for state structures provides another 
benefit—knowledge of how to communicate with state agencies. This knowledge is singled out 
as a particularly specific and important skill which defines the success of the NGO and cross-
sectoral collaboration. Some specialist knowledge is needed to prepare applications and take 
financial support from the state (which is now, in fact, virtually the only legitimate source of 
support in Russia): “we act as an administrative resource for them. As a rule, they do not know 
how to write applications, somehow they cannot do that. In-person work with people is what 
they do. So we help them” (Samara’s Charity foundation Radost’). 
The strategies of successful and developed NGOs are predetermined by the goal of interacting 
efficiently with the state authorities. Based on the findings of this research, we can identify some 
of the most important skills: knowing how to craft the “right” reputation for the NGO; 
formulating requests or suggestions correctly; and understanding how and when to present an 
idea. Each of these components requires its own hidden knowledge. Thus, constructing the 
reputation of an NGO involves a number of activities: conferences, round tables, meetings, and 
membership in different networks and councils. NGOs value each opportunity for public 
presentation, and try to do it in the best possible way: “[if] I do not have time to prepare a 
‘smart’ presentation, I would rather cancel my participation” (Samara’s Charity foundation 
Radost’). 
Forming a proper reputation in the eyes of the authority entails NGOs competing for resources. 
One’s reputation is constructed through the process of communication with the authorities—and 
                                                        
62 Regular open child welfare supervision organized by NGO “Partniorstvo” in St. Petersburg. 
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also, primarily, for the authorities. NGOs regard the construction of a proper reputation as a very 
important component of their work, one that requires a serious investment of effort.  
There is no single formula for crafting the reputation of an NGO, but analyses of interviews 
suggest several key components. Constructing a credible reputation definitely requires tolerance 
toward current state social policy and a willingness to compromise with the authorities. The 
NGO has to have skills in communicating with the authorities, using the language and rules 
shared by the authorities. In this sense, certain Russian NGOs find themselves in a similar 
position to the Chinese NGOs described by Mertha,63 in that abiding by the established “rules of 
the game” may offer them more opportunity to influence policy development than acting in 
opposition to the existing political regime. Having a reputation as a professional NGO providing 
unique social services gives the organization the opportunity to be included in cross-sectoral 
networks. Participation in these networks in turn gives the NGO a better chance (which is still 
quite modest) of influencing political decisions. A final important component of reputation is 
that the NGO must be perceived to be efficient, and establishing efficiency in the current 
situation again requires close collaboration with the authorities.  
In constructing the “right” reputation, NGOs seek to maximize their contact with the authorities. 
They use different methods to create a mutual interest between themselves and state social 
services. NGOs have regular contact with the authorities, but they also try to stimulate the 
interest of state social services in the NGOs by organizing their own platforms for 
communication, such as the open city supervision in St. Petersburg, or the special section at the 
regional Duma in Samara. Professionalism is what may attract the attention of the authorities 
here. Efforts made by the NGOs to construct a proper reputation for themselves may, however, 
erase the boundary between the government and NGOs. To be successful and efficient, NGOs 
are forced to demonstrate values such as, for example, accountability or loyalty, which are much 
more important among state actors than within civil society. The porous border between state 
and non-state actors may, in certain cases, give the NGOs access to the mechanisms of 
governance, which would hardly be available normally to non-governmental organizations. By 
maximizing contact with the authorities, NGOs receive certain benefits that allow them to 
develop their independent projects, but this process can require an organization to make certain 
compromises which have implications for its activities and sometimes for its very survival, as 
the example below demonstrates.  
In the aftermath of recent legal changes, one of our respondents, the SOS Village, appeared to be 
in a very ambiguous situation, in which they were forced to defend their status as a children’s 
home as well as a specific form of family-based care. The SOS Village enjoys the support of the 
Children’s Ombudsman and its founder—the Russian Committee SOS Children’s Villages. 
These agents lobby for the interests of the Villages at the legislative level, and represent the 
Villages in different Committees and Ministries. The development of children’s villages as a 
specific and successful form of care for orphans was listed as a priority in the National Strategy:  
Continuation of the reform of institutions for orphans and children without parental care, 
accomplished by downsizing, creating conditions close to the family, creating new 
modern children's homes in the form of a children's village in accordance with 
international standards and modern methods of development, education, rehabilitation of 
orphans and children without parental care…64. 
According to an interview with the director of the SOS Village, recognition of this form of care 
for orphans at the level of the National Strategy was the result of the efforts of the Russian 
Committee SOS Children’s Villages. 
                                                        
63 Mertha. 2009: 995-1012. 
64 No. 761 “On National Strategy of Action for Children 2012 – 2017," 5:3 
http://base.garant.ru/70183566/#friends#ixzz3oloLfpdg  (accessed on 8 August 2015). 
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At that time, the National Strategy clearly defined a general trend towards family-based care for 
orphans. Additionally, the “Dima Yakovlev Law” prioritized the adoption of orphans by Russian 
citizens. As a consequence, the SOS Villages received recommendations from above, 
simultaneously from the Ministry of Education and the Russian Committee SOS Children’s 
Villages, to formalize guardianship over their pupils. This meant that the Villages were forced to 
form foster families, and switch from an institutional to a family model of care. The transition to 
foster families had substantial consequences for the SOS Villages. From a legal viewpoint, the 
institutional children’s homes had to transform into a network of foster families. SOS mothers 
were compelled to head foster families, which required greater responsibility and legal 
obligation towards children as compared with the responsibilities of an employed caregiver. 
Currently, two forms of families are permitted in the Russian SOS Villages: the SOS-family, in 
which the director of the Village is the trustee of all children, and foster families, where the 
guardians of children are their foster parents. 
The Ministry of Education and the head organisation of the SOS project in Russia both sent 
recommendations to the SOS Village. This fact indicates that the question on SOS villages was 
discussed at high levels of government. Some compromises were achieved and SOS villages 
continue their work in Russia. However, the status of the Villages was obviously manipulated for 
state interests. The administrative and reputational aspects of the existence of Villages in Russia 
became more complicated.  
Ambiguity of status gives birth to involuntary duplication. Children’s homes and associations of 
foster families are legally distinct forms of organization. The Village is thus forced to have two 
“faces”: one for the Russian state, and one for the international founder. Legally this may entail 
for them the necessity of double accounting, and manipulating the statuses of orphans, who may 
be recognized as orphans, as pupils of a children’s home, or as children placed in foster families. 
The last status meets the requirements of official regulations much better than the first one. 
In addition, the importance of the social programs promoted by the NGOs must be strongly 
argued to the state authorities and in making such arguments, the current discourse of the state’s 
social policy has to be taken into account. Protection of children is legitimated by the current 
political mood, but not every project for child protection can be promoted. To be successful, the 
project has to add to the public system of social services, while at the same time claiming to be 
independent of it.  
As a result, being perceived to be in “opposition” to the authorities is counterproductive for 
NGOs. Examples show that projects or actions initiated by NGOs that violate the stable rules of 
state social care may lead to consequences which are undesirable both for the activists and for 
their clients—children.  
During one of the visits [to an orphanage] I met a boy who had enlarged lymph nodes. I 
asked him, and he answered that he had been ill for three weeks, but nobody did 
anything. Then I took him in my own car to the hospital, where the doctor wrote a list of 
diagnoses and a list of necessary medications. When I brought him back with all his 
medications to the orphanage, the doctor at the orphanage got angry and told me that I 
shouldn’t have done that. After that, access to all the nearby orphanages was officially 
revoked for me and all other volunteers of our NGO (Samara’s Domiki Detstva). 
Thus, a NGO’s successful operation essentially depends on its positioning. Loyalty and readiness 
to seek consensus are the basic aspects of an NGO’s position, which make productive 
collaboration between the NGOs and authorities possible. To work successfully, and in order 
simply to survive, NGOs are forced not only to provide their social services, but also to be 
visible and noticeable to the authorities.  
In general, the NGOs providing child protection position themselves as two entities: as an 
executor and as an expert.  An executor protects its function of implementing state social policy. 
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In positioning itself as an expert, an NGO is forced to demonstrate certain additional aspects in 
addition to loyalty and openness for compromise, such as deep knowledge or unique skills in a 
particular sphere and the ability to develop new social programs.  
 
Conclusion 
The segment of civil society represented by NGOs protecting children in contemporary Russia is 
affected by socio-political, legal and even moral discourses. Moreover, the rules of the game 
which the state offers to NGOs, are transforming rapidly. Legal initiatives of the last few years 
contribute to a convergence between state and non-state actors, operating in the social sphere, 
which includes the field of child protection. In the conditions of a declining economy, the state 
regards NGOs mainly as assistants in the implementation of state social policy.  Nevertheless, it 
would be wrong to assert that opportunities to influence policy are totally absent for non-state 
actors. The results of our research indicate that there are both opportunities and restrictions for 
NGOs where policy entrepreneurship is concerned, which also means that prospects for civil 
society development in Russia may be more hopeful than they sometimes appear.  
The issue of firmer control by the state is challenging for NGOs who are willing to act as policy 
entrepreneurs. Socially oriented NGOs are almost entirely dependent on state subsidies. This 
means that an NGO’s reputation acquires special significance. Professionalism and the 
willingness to work in a consensual manner are important components of the reputation: an NGO 
has to demonstrate regularly and publicly its efficiency and indispensability. At that very 
moment any NGO has to play by the rules established by the state. In such conditions policy 
networking serves a dual purpose. On one hand, collaboration with state actors gives the NGOs 
opportunities to improve certain policy options. On the other hand, cooperation with state 
officials may be a necessary condition for an NGO’s survival and sustainability. Besides, 
construction of the “right” reputation takes a lot of additional efforts and resources from NGOs, 
and makes them totally transparent to the state. 
Financial dependence on state grants makes socially oriented NGOs vulnerable, and 
independently authored projects initiated by NGOs suffer first and foremost. Developing such 
projects is a complicated process, which has a chance of succeeding only when it aligns with 
general trends in state social policy. The case of the relatively successful program Breathing 
Room shows that great efforts to promote a unique and extremely necessary social project may 
achieve an endorsement on the level of national standards of care for children, but still comes up 
against limits in attaining the level of a state-funded federal social program. The high degree of 
dependence on the state calls into question the possibility for NGOs to have independence and 
autonomy. 
Nevertheless, socially oriented NGOs protecting children see in the process of “domestication” 
of the third sector new opportunities for solving problems and delivering policy suggestions. The 
main tool of policymaking here is contact with the authorities. Participation in official networks - 
such as meetings of regular working groups and councils, and membership in the Public 
Chamber - gives NGOs public visibility which helps to construct a proper reputation for the 
NGO and establishes their credibility as policy entrepreneurs. In some respects, the idea of real 
collaboration between state and non-state actors seems bogus, although inclusion into the formal 
networks allows building up new cross-sectoral contacts – this is how they get real support and 
opportunities for the development of policy options. Key contacts, which increase the efficiency 
of policy efforts, may issue not from official platforms, but from informal networks, long-term 
experience of working in the same field, prior experience of professional collaboration, or 
simply friendly relations between individual state and non-state actors.  
In the sphere of defending children, representatives of NGOs have a number of opportunities to 
discuss problems in state policy towards vulnerable children. In particular, NGOs have good 
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opportunities to express their opinions to state providers of social policy. Officials at the 
executive level take part in the meetings of official cross-sectoral forums.  At the lower level of 
executive power, the line between non-state actors and officials is rather porous. The main 
problem in developing a policy option is caused by the “vertical of power,” which remains very 
strong in Russia. The delivery of a policy solution to political decision-makers requires extensive 
efforts, and this is a common difficulty for NGOs and low-level officials. The best solution for 
this problem is NGOs operating at the federal level or Child Ombudsmen assisting NGOs in the 
improvement of policy options.  
 
 
 
 
 
